The author of a blog called
Death and the Maiden has
solicited other bloggers' definitions of torture, so I thought I'd offer something of a synopsis of my own thoughts. Those familiar with my writing and my blog will have already seen much of this material in one form or another, and in fact some of what follows is a somewhat abbreviated version of what I wrote in a recent journal article (currently in press - probably in print early next year).
If we're going to define torture,
The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Punishment or Treatment (UN General Assembly, 1984) offers a useful starting point: "any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” Acts that would be considered torture under the above definition include a variety of methods: severe beatings, electric shock, sexual abuse and rape, prolonged solitary confinement, hard labor, near drowning, near suffocation, mutilation, hanging for prolonged periods, deprivation of basic biological needs (e.g., sleep, food, water), subjection to forced constant standing or crouching, and excessive continuous noise. Torture may also include actions inducing psychological suffering such as threats against the victim’s family or loved ones.
When I discuss torture, it is in the context of my work as an aggression researcher. Aggression can best be thought of any behavior that is aimed at harming another person (needless to say, I've come across plenty of individual definitions of aggression, but that seems to be the element contained in all of those definitions). At the extreme end of the aggressive behavior spectrum are those behaviors that we would label as violence. I tend to view violence as behavior that inflicts serious physical and psychological harm on its victims. Often when we think of violence, we think in terms of interpersonal violence - i.e., involving the direct physical involvement of at least one perpetrator and victim. Certainly if we examine the testimonials of its victims, the occasional former torturer who is willing to come forward, and the occasional photos and videos that get circulated (as was the case with the infamous Abu Ghraib torture scandal). Indeed, that is a partially helpful way of viewing torture. However, I also find it helpful to utilize a definition of violence used by sociologists that views violence not only as interpersonal, but as also having organizational and structural elements. When discussing organizational violence, we refer to the various bureaucratic decisions made by individuals in positions of relative authority, and typically at a distance from the pain and suffering inflicted. In the case of torture, those individuals would be high-ranking military officials, officials working in intelligence agencies, and elected and appointed political officials. As far as structural violence is concerned, here we look at the pain and suffering caused due to systematic deprivation of necessary resources, such as access to legal representation. To make a long story short, I view torture as involving a combination of all three elements.
What causes torture? I tend to divide causes into distal and proximate. Distal causes are ones that are part of the perpetrators’ social background over a long period of time, which will influence their readiness to behave violently. Proximate risk factors include those situational and individual variables that are present in the current social episode.
Distal Causes of Torture 1.) Cultural norms. In examining distal precursors to torture, we must certainly include cultural norms that support violence. For example, there is little doubt that prior to the Abu Ghraib torture scandal, the United States showed widespread societal acceptance of excessive military force and torture (Chomsky, 2004; Churchill, 2003; Zinn, 1995). America’s history is replete with violent lynchings and genocide domestically and excessive violence internationally (see, e.g., Churchill, 2003; Graham & Gurr, 1979; Zinn, 1995) along with a pattern of bending – if not outright breaking Constitutional and international laws and treaties in order to carry out said violence (Churchill, 2003). In fact, for a “nation of peace” hardly a year has gone by in which there hasn’t been at least some military action carried out either domestically or internationally (Churchill, 2003). That history is coupled with a sort of cultural myopia – sometimes referred to as “American exceptionalism” (see Churchill, 2003) – in which America’s treatment of others in the developing world is perceived to be based on the most noble of intentions and in which human rights abuses, when they do occur, are looked at as merely isolated exceptions contrary to otherwise “benign” policies and practices (Chomsky, 2004; Churchill, 2003). Add to that a tendency to consider those belonging to nations in the developing world as “children” in need of discipline – a metaphor that appears often in the spoken and written words of many of America’s political and military leaders, both past and present (Chomsky, 2004; see also Lakoff, 2002 for a detailed treatment of the metaphor underlying this view). From such a vantage point, it is perhaps quite unsurprising that human rights abuses, such as those at Abu Ghraib, occur routinely as the culture of the military system (itself a microcosm of the nation it serves) invites soldiers to perceive themselves as “strict fathers” providing stern discipline to “wayward children” (Lakoff, 2002).
2.) Violent media and propaganda. As part of the cultural Zeitgeist in states that sanction torture, we will find evidence of widespread exposure to propaganda designed to demonize and dehumanize the victims. In the United States, for example, Muslims have been portrayed in the mass media for decades as backward savages who have no respect for international law and who pose a threat to Western civilization. The Greek torturers studied by Haritos-Fatouros (2003) had certainly been exposed to various forms of anti-communist and university student propaganda prior to joining the Greek military. Individuals exposed to media violence become more prone to behave violently due to two factors. First, exposure to media violence (e.g., films, video games, music, literature) is linked to increased levels of aggressive behavior in both lab experiments and field studies. Longitudinal research also shows that the effects of media violence exposure can linger for decades. Huesmann (1998) contends that exposure to media violence leads to the storage of violent behavioral scripts in long-term memory which may be invoked at a later time. The more exposure that individuals have to media violence, the more they rehearse those behavioral scripts, thus making those behavioral scripts increasingly automatic. Second, exposure to media violence serves to desensitize individuals to violence. Individuals become less likely to notice violent behavior and less likely to intervene if they do notice.
3) Authoritarian personality. It is conceivable that some individuals are more prone to engage in torture than others - in particular those who are highly right-wing authoritarian. I tend to draw on Bob Altemeyer's theory and research on authoritarianism, and view it as a personality type composed of three dimensions: conventionalism, authoritarian submission, and authoritarian aggression. Conventionalism is a tendency to go along with the prevailing societal norms, especially those norms sanctioned by authority figures in the home, church, etc. Authoritarian submission is the tendency to essentially do what one is told without question, as long as it’s sanctioned by an authority figure. Authoritarian aggression refers to punitive acts of aggression and violence that are sanctioned (or at least perceived to be sanctioned) by relevant authority figures. The extent to which authoritarian personality is involved in making a torturer is debatable. On the one hand, it is often the case that despotic regimes recruit individuals who hold or appear to hold right-wing political views. We also know that lab research shows that individuals who are highly right-wing authoritarian comply to a greater degree in a Milgram-style obedience experiment than do non-authoritarians. That said, it is unclear to what extent actual torturers are have authoritarian personalities. For example, in Haritos-Fatouros' (2003) work examining the factors influencing Greek torturers during the rule of the military junta of the late 1960s, there is little evidence to suggest that authoritarian personality played any role whatsoever.
Proximate Causes of Torture
In discussing torturers’ “obedience to the authority of violence,” Haritos-Fatouros (2003; see also, Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros, & Zimbardo, 2002; Zimbardo, 2004) outlines a number of proximate causes designed to increase compliance and bonding with those in authority as well as with peers, and to reduce stress and strain.
1.) Harassment, compliance, and conformity. If the perpetrators feel sufficiently trapped in the situation, authorities are better positioned to order them to continue escalating destructive behaviors against their victims. If the perception is that there is no viable recourse but to continue doling out the abuse, then it’s not terribly surprising that the perpetrators will do precisely as they are told.
2.) Deindividuation of the torturer. Destructive obedience is much more easily carried out if the perpetrator can distance himself or herself from the victim (Milgram, 1965, 1974). This can be facilitated by deindividuation (e.g., uniforms, etc., that make one blend in with the group, thus decreasing accountability; see Zimbardo, 1970).
3.) Dehumanization of the victim. Victims may be dehumanized in a number of ways, including the use of racial epithets, claims that the victims are “savages” or “have no souls” or are “sub-human”, thus reducing the perpetrator’s ability to empathize with the victim. Disguising victims with hoods or masks can also achieve similar effect (Zimbardo, 2004). The photos that documented the torture in Abu Ghraib showed prisoners who were hooded, whose faces were covered by female undergarments, or completely stripped of clothing altogether (Hersh, 2004) – which itself can have a dehumanizing effect to the extent that they are being stripped of their identities and their cultures. We can also look at the rampant racism and ethnocentrism that appears to be endemic in the U.S. military culture. The organization itself promotes the use of racial and ethnic slurs (e.g., Hajjis, ragheads) and stereotypes (e.g., Islam as a religion that is inherently violent) that serve to dehumanize their victims (see, e.g., Rockwell, 2005). The more psychological distance that can be created in such an environment, the more difficult it is for military personnel to have empathy with the prisoners and it is this loss of empathy that may pave the path to torture.
4.) Victim blame. One means of reducing the psychological strain of destructive obedience is to shift responsibility to the victim. In Milgram’s (1974) obedience experiments, for example, participants often blamed the victim for having volunteered for the experiment in the first place, or blamed the victim for being stupid or obstinate. Haritos-Fatouros (2003) observes a similar phenomenon among Greek torturers. The psychological function of blaming victims of torture for their humiliation is to make the torture victim appear less than human, which in turn reduces the perpetrators’ inhibitions. In fact, such victim blame is likely facilitated by techniques in which the victims’ pain or humiliation appears self-inflicted (McCoy, 2006). By releasing the psychological constraints regarding how to treat fellow human beings, torturers find it easier to engage in the cruel treatment of their victims.
5.) Belief in a higher cause. Atrocity perpetrators often believe that they are acting in the name of some higher cause. The Greek military junta of the late 1960s and early 1970s trained recruits to believe that they were serving a sort of “Greek Christianity” and that they were “pillars of the state” whose actions were necessary in the struggle against evil, inhuman dissidents (Haritos-Fatouros, 2003). Belief in a higher cause enables torturers to align themselves with those in authority while at the same time viewing torture victims as tangible threats to that order. To the extent that torture can be perceived as “just, moral, and worthy,” torturers can deceive themselves into believing that their actions are ultimately good.
6.) Social modeling. The modeling of torture may be done either formally (as in the case of the Greek military police; Haritos-Fatouros, 2003) or informally (as in the case of Brazilian torturers and executioners; Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros, & Zimbardo, 2002). Role modeling may be either direct or indirect, and may be either explicit or implicit. As part of formal or informal training, recruits may be directly involved in acts of abuse against victims or merely brought along as observers. In the case of Abu Ghraib, it is plain that the organizational culture was primed for human rights abuses. It appears that at every level of the US military organization there was an acceptance of cruel treatment. General Sanchez, for example, obviously had no problems with activities that were known violations of international law as recent news reports have shown (American Civil Liberties Union, 2005). He led by example. Of course we also know that the military was highly secretive about its treatment of POWs, as has been discussed in detail elsewhere (see, e.g., Ratner & Ray, 2004, for more detail).
7) Trivialization and routinization of evil. Destructive obedience does not occur overnight, but rather the perpetrator must be eased into increasingly brutal behaviors over a period of time. Both Milgram (1965, 1974) and Zimbardo (1970) aptly demonstrated this point with their own experimental research, and historically we’ve seen this point documented time and time again (the atrocities committed by the Germans during the Nazi era come most readily to mind). By gradually escalating the abuses against the victims, those who will perpetrate those abuses don’t realize what’s going on until it is too late. They become increasingly desensitized to the horrors that are going on around them, and that they too may be perpetrating.
The horrors present in Abu Ghraib did not happen immediately, but rather escalated over a period of months. Indeed, the basic thrust of the Sanchez memo (American Civil Liberties Union, 2005) provides some insight into the desensitization process. Once personnel are used to roughing up prisoners, threatening them with muzzled dogs, and placing them in highly uncomfortable postures for long periods of time, personnel are unlikely to perceive encouragements to “up the ante” as extreme. Gradually, using un-muzzled attack dogs, sodomy, and other torturous acts become seen as “normal” or “reasonable” behaviors within the context of the military prison - so normal, in fact, that personnel likely saw nothing unusual in posing next to these tortured prisoners as their colleagues took photos (Hersh, 2004).
Diffusion of responsibility is another vehicle for trivializing torture. Destructive obedience is most easily facilitated under conditions where the perpetrators can pass the buck to someone else. Perhaps the authorities in charge give their assurances that they, rather than the perpetrators, are in charge and responsible for whatever outcomes occur (Milgram, 1965, 1974). Diffusion of responsibility may be accomplished by compartmentalizing tasks sufficiently so that one has only a small role in the abuse that is perpetrated. Some individuals in a prison camp may be merely assigned clerical duties, whereas others have some other limited role in the process of torturing or harming their victims. This provides the basis for the so-called “Nuremberg Defense” in which one can claim to be merely following orders, or simply involved in filing paperwork, taking photos, or other routine tasks. Diffusion of responsibility can also be facilitated by group size. In large groups where individuals feel relatively anonymous, it is easier to engage in cruel behaviors, such as lynchings (e.g., Mullen, 1986).
